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Abstract
Aim of study: Incentivising landowners to supply ecosystem services remains challenging, especially when this requires long-
term investments such as reforestation. We investigated how landowners perceive, and would respond to, distinct types of incentives 
for planting diverse native trees on private lands in Lebanon. Our aim was to understand landowners’ attitudes towards hypothetical 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) contracts options; their likely participation; and the potential additionality they would provide. 
Area of study: Highland villages situated within eight of Lebanon’s 20 Important Plant Areas. 
Material and methods:  Mixed-methods surveys were conducted with 34 landowners to determine past, present and future land-
use strategies. Study participants were presented with three differently structured reforestation contract options (or schemes). The 
three schemes (results-based loan, action-based grant, and results-based payments) differed in their expected risks and benefits to 
landowners. Qualitative debriefing questions followed each of the schemes presented.
Main results: Although the results-based loan did deter uptake relative to the lower risk action-based grant, results-based payments 
did not significantly increase uptake or planting area, suggesting asymmetric attitudes to risk. Qualitative probing revealed economic, 
social (e.g. trust) and institutional factors (e.g. legal implications of planting forest trees on private land) that limited willingness to 
participate in the results-based contract option.
Research highlights: This study demonstrates the importance of combining qualitative and quantitative methods to better understand 
landowner perceptions of incentives and risks, particularly in challenging socio-political contexts.
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Introduction
Economic theory postulates that many environmental 
problems exist because markets have not been fully 
developed for biodiversity or most ecosystem (or 
environmental) services (Pattanayak et al., 2010). 
Increasing demand for agricultural commodities has 
therefore undermined important ecosystem services 
such as carbon sequestration and watershed protection, 
making agricultural expansion one of the major drivers 
of deforestation and biodiversity loss globally (Gibbs 
et al., 2010). Despite the steady rise in protected areas 
in the last decade, conserving biodiversity is expected 
to become more challenging due to climate change 
and increasing competition for land (Pullin et al., 
2013). However, policy instruments such as payments 
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for ecosystem services (PES) and agri-environment 
schemes are being adopted widely to incentivise 
landowners to supply off-farm ecosystem services 
from private lands (Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013).
PES are defined by Wunder (2007) as voluntary and 
conditional transactions between at least one buyer and 
one seller for the supply of additional units of a clearly-
defined ecosystem service, or land-uses likely to 
generate those services. PES has become an attractive 
environmental policy instrument given its voluntary 
nature, allowing for public and private participation 
at various scales, and its flexibility in combining 
economic incentives with existing regulatory policies 
(Barrett et al., 2013). Yet important challenges 
in designing PES include the trade-offs between 
efficiency and social equity, which can influence 
long-term ecological outcomes (Pascual et al., 2014). 
From an economic perspective, PES investments often 
compete with existing land-uses (e.g. agriculture) and 
maintaining lower payments would attract landowners 
with lowest opportunity costs. This approach may have 
distributional consequences, since landowners with 
larger holdings and lower opportunity costs are favoured 
over those with smaller holdings whose incomes are 
tied to farming (McDermott et al., 2013). Competitive 
PES schemes could also displace agriculture or other 
productive activities leading to land conversion and 
intensification elsewhere sometimes referred to as 
‘leakage’ (Pattanayak et al., 2010).
Hitherto, PES have largely focused on use-restricting 
strategies, e.g. avoided deforestation, but are increasingly 
employed to finance reforestation (or afforestation), 
referred to as asset-building schemes (Wunder, 2008). 
However, recent studies have criticised carbon-focused 
PES and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD+) for incentivising monoculture 
plantations, negatively impacting biodiversity and 
local livelihoods (e.g. Lindenmayer et al., 2012). 
Locatelli et al. (2014) argued that carbon-focussed 
incentives would not automatically result in bundled 
co-benefits for biodiversity and local ecosystem 
services. Designing biodiversity-enhancing reforesta-
tion schemes (using even mixes of native species) that 
are both cost-effective and attract participants remains 
challenging. We administered a mixed-methods survey 
to explore the willingness of Lebanese landowners 
from highland villages to accept incentives for planting 
diverse native tree species on private lands. Survey 
participants were presented with three alternative PES 
contracts schemes (Table S1 [suppl]): Scheme 1, a 
results-based loan (involving repayments conditional 
on seedling survival: negative conditionality); Scheme 
2, an action-based grant (conditional on planting only); 
and Scheme 3, results-based payments (conditional on 
seedling survival: positive conditionality). Our aim 
was to understand landowners’ attitudes towards these 
three differently structured hypothetical PES contracts 
options; factors influencing decisions to participate; 
and the likely displacement that could result. 
Material and methods
Reforestation in Lebanon
While reforestation efforts were traditionally 
conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), in 
1998 the Lebanese parliament transferred funds instead 
to the Ministry of Environment (MOE) to develop a 
National Reforestation Plan (NRP) to increase forest 
cover from 13% to 20% (Regato & Asmar, 2011). Early 
phases of the NRP suffered high seedling mortality, 
partly due to a lack of funds for maintenance (e.g. 
irrigation and protection from grazing). Therefore, the 
last phase of the NRP (c. 2009-2012) was developed 
as a quasi-PES scheme, where selected municipalities 
were paid at different stages based on area planted 
and survival outcomes (MOE/UNDP/GEF, 2014). 
The Lebanese government has also shown interest 
in using the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) to fund re/afforestation projects 
to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions (MOE/
UNDP/GEF, 2009). More recently, the MOA initiated a 
campaign to plant 40 million trees through its National 
Afforestation/Reforestation Program initiated in 2014 
and intends to adopt a forest and landscape restoration 
approach (Mohanna et al., 2017). Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) with interests in using PES have 
increasingly become active in re/afforestation in recent 
years (R. Paton, 2012, pers. comm.).
Our study therefore assumes that ecosystem services 
(ES) buyers could be either the public sector (e.g. MOA/
MOE), NGOs, or both (with funding often provided 
through partnering international donor agencies). We 
determined in a previous study that these reforestation 
stakeholders are interested in increasing forest cover 
to enhance a broad array of forest ES (including 
landscape beauty, soil and water conservation, as well 
as biodiversity) rather than paying for specific ES (e.g. 
carbon sequestration). However, the ES anticipated 
heavily depends on the kinds and ratios of species 
being planted and managed. For example, plantations 
of fast-growing trees (e.g. eucalypts) may sequester 
carbon much more efficiently than most slow-growing 
natives, yet may also limit certain regulating services 
(e.g. water and nutrient cycling, pollination, disease 
mitigation). In fact, stakeholders expressed concerns 
over the lack of species diversity in past reforestation 
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as well as the recent increase in exotics (e.g. Paulownia 
spp.), and have begun addressing the importance 
of maintaining resilient forest ecosystems through 
diversifying the planting of native species (R Paton 
& S Bou Fakhreddine, 2012, pers. comm.). Fruit trees 
are commonly planted in these regions and apples 
account for a sizeable proportion of crop production. 
Apple orchards may contribute to certain ecosystem 
services such as carbon sequestration (Wu et al., 2012); 
however, commercial orchards often require high 
inputs (e.g. irrigation, pesticides and fertilizers), which 
can negatively impact biodiversity and other ES (e.g. 
pollination and watershed maintenance). 
Recent reforestation efforts in Lebanon have 
focussed predominantly on municipal lands. Some 
implementing stakeholders expressed doubts about 
transacting with private landowners due to uncertainties 
with long-term tree retention and costs (R Paton, 2012, 
pers. comm.). However, while opportunity costs may 
sometimes be lower on municipal lands, transaction 
costs (e.g. monitoring to ensure compliance) are 
often higher compared to private landowners with 
proper titles (Engel et al., 2008), particularly under 
reforestation contracts that often extend beyond 
the political terms of elected mayors. Yet contract 
attributes that characterise conditionality are what 
mainly influence transaction costs, thus posing a 
significant challenge for designing cost-effective PES 
contracts (Peterson et al., 2015). Risk and uncertainty 
appear to be ubiquitous in many farming decisions, 
e.g. crop-selection and adopting new technologies, 
where decisions are made based on both attitudes 
towards risks and subjective beliefs (Menapace et al., 
2013). These factors, along with opportunity costs 
and the institutional context where transactions occur, 
can influence landowner decisions to participate in 
PES schemes. Understanding Lebanese landowners’ 
perceptions of asset-building PES is therefore critical 
for informing future reforestation policy. 
Factors affecting PES uptake
While participation in PES schemes often depends 
on landowners’ opportunity costs (Chen et al., 2010), 
the literature has identified other factors that affect 
participation in asset-building PES schemes, including 
contract design and social-institutional factors. 
PES must be conditional on verified actions (e.g. 
planting trees) or results (e.g. carbon sequestration), 
requiring monitoring of sellers to ensure compliance 
(Honey-Rosés et al., 2009). In asset-building 
programmes like reforestation, with high short-term 
costs and delayed benefits, a fundamental issue of 
concern to PES buyers is ensuring long term delivery 
of ecosystem services (Pattanayak et al., 2010). For 
PES buyers, contract designs often involve trade-offs 
between supplier uptake, transaction costs, and expected 
outcomes (Engel et al., 2008). Contracts that are highly 
bureaucratic or involve excessive conditionality are 
perceived as being too onerous or risky, reducing 
landowner uptake (Hudson & Lusk, 2004). In contrast, 
lack of conditionality or monitoring could result in non-
compliance (e.g. hidden action) by sellers (Wunder et 
al., 2014). The choice of payment by actions or results, 
together with the optimal level of conditionality and 
monitoring, will depend on the context: the strength of 
the connection between actions and results, the ease of 
monitoring each, and the level of risk aversion of sellers 
and buyers (Gibbons et al., 2011). Asset-building PES 
may therefore require a mixture of results- and action-
based payments over time to cover high initial costs 
whilst ensuring tree retention (Wunder et al., 2014). 
Payments are often frontloaded and gradually decreased 
once private benefits from planted trees were available 
to participants, but this is best suited to productive 
species (Hegde et al., 2014). Setting conditions for 
ensuring mixed native species are planted and retained 
is more challenging (Montagnini & Finney, 2011).
Understanding farmers’ identities and how they 
perceive risks or uncertainties towards livelihood 
changes is also important (Duesberg et al., 2013). 
Social-institutional factors such as trust in (or 
experience with) incentive-based schemes, local norms 
and values, dependence on farm-based activities, 
as well as age and level of education also influence 
landowners’ decisions to join PES schemes (Chen et 
al., 2009; Fisher, 2012). Participants in asset-building 
PES tend to have relatively large landholdings, with 
enough land unsuitable for agriculture, and whose 
incomes are largely off-farm (Cole, 2010). The context 
under which the farming system is structured, along 
with secure tenure and technical or financial know-how 
may also determine uptake (Kosoy et al., 2008). Factors 
such as commitment period and required percentage of 
landholdings allocated have also been found to affect 
farmer uptake into PES schemes (Kisaka & Obi, 
2015). Building trust in the institutions responsible 
for ensuring payments often takes time, and poorer 
more risk-averse landowners may be less willing to 
participate (Fisher, 2012). These issues are particularly 
critical in cases where governments are buyers or 
intermediaries, yet have lost the confidence of farmers 
through previous policies. Beyond this, PES is even 
more challenging to implement under circumstances 
where legal and property institutions are weak, which 
is common in many developing countries (Matzdorf et 
al., 2013). Even in developed countries like Germany, 
land tenure implications and contractual uncertainties 
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were principal reasons behind farmers’ reluctance to 
join PES schemes (Schleyer & Plieninger, 2011).
Study area
Lebanon is a small (10,452 km2), predominantly 
mountainous country located in the eastern 
Mediterranean basin and recognised as a centre for 
plant diversity (Davis et al., 1994). Recognising threats 
to plant diversity in the eastern Mediterranean, a small 
team of scientists from the American University of 
Beirut’s Nature Conservation Center (AUB-NCC) 
started a project to define Important Plant Areas (IPAs) 
in Lebanon (Yazbek et al., 2010). Designated IPAs 
are also shown to represent the major ecosystems and 
unique habitats of Lebanon. Our study area comprised 
the western slopes of Mount Lebanon where eight 
of Lebanon’s 20 newly designated IPAs are located 
(Radford et al., 2011). These areas are characteristic 
of eu-mediterranean (> 1,000 m) to oro-mediterranean 
(2,200 - 2,800 m) bioclimatic zones, averaging between 
1000-1200 mm/yr, precipitation mostly occurring 
between November and March. While this region has 
been characterised as being predominantly semi-arid, 
many microclimates can exist between and even within 
some IPAs selected for our study (Yazbek et al., 2010). 
The vegetation types are typical of Mediterranean 
forest, woodland and scrub communities containing 
coniferous, deciduous and mixed forest/woodlands, 
interspersed with semi-natural agro-ecosystems 
(Makhzoumi et al., 2012). The region produces a 
variety of tree crops, predominantly apples and stone 
fruits (Salibi, 2007). The main rainfed crops are 
cherries, often planted at much higher elevations. 
Irrigation is a major limiting factor for farmers in 
these steep and rocky landscapes, requiring extensive 
terracing to preserve soils and enable irrigation using 
canals. Irrigation comes from the numerous springs 
that form the tributaries of seasonal rivers and streams 
that flow along the western flank of Mt. Lebanon into 
the sea. Habitats are increasingly threatened by land-
uses that include intensive agriculture, overgrazing, 
urbanisation and quarrying, as well as fires (Sattout & 
Abboud, 2007).
Sampling 
We focused on IPAs with reforestation potential but 
were unable to conduct our research in high-risk parts 
of the country, i.e. the Bekaa Valley, South Lebanon 
and near the Syrian border. Eight of the 20 IPAs located 
along the west-facing slopes of the Mt Lebanon were 
selected for this study (Fig. 1). Due to security concerns, 
many villages in the Akkar district (LB07) near the 
Syrian border were also excluded. A total of 248 villages 
were identified using Google Earth images embedded 
with IPA layers that were copied and transposed over 
administrative maps showing all village/municipal 
boundaries. Villages were stratified according to IPA, 
estimated geographic size, population, rurality and 
elevation. A stratified random sample of 18 villages 
within these IPAs were selected (see Table S2 [suppl]). 
Security concerns also necessitated obtaining landowner 
contact details from mayors and other key informants 
from sampled villages who acted as our gatekeepers 
and facilitated our research. We obtained contact details 
for 52 landowners who were sole proprietors of their 
holdings, who were then telephoned. After at least two 
attempts we spoke to 46 landowners, informed them of 
the study objectives, and asked for their oral consent. 
Twelve landowners declined to participate because of a 
lack of land, land tenure issues (e.g. inheritance), age or 
inconvenience. The final survey was conducted with 34 
newly recruited participants with their written consent 
who had not participated in a previous extensive pilot. 
Our research team was faced with substantial safety 
risks given the turmoil in Syria, which at the time began 
showing signs of potentially spilling over into Lebanon. 
This limited our sample size.
Data acquisition, survey instruments and analyses
The survey (see Table S3 [suppl]) was conducted 
in Arabic by the first author and a field assistant in 
the participants’ villages, either at their farm, home, 
workplace, or the municipality office. After obtaining 
written consent, each participant was given an overview 
of the study and its objectives. After discussing current 
and intended land-use, the interviewer introduced the 
three hypothetical PES schemes in succession (see Table 
S1 [suppl]) to gauge their acceptability and to stimulate 
discussion of the key research themes identified above 
(the schemes were presented to each respondent in 
the same order for this reason). Entry into any of the 
schemes only required that they plant a minimum of 
1,000 m2 of contiguous land that they had titles to with 
the seedlings provided under the programme. Study 
participants were provided with a list of available 
native species (see Table S4 [suppl]) that would be 
used in the PES programme and told that the kinds and 
quantities of each species would be determined by the 
programme team. Seedling survival would be estimated 
by a monitoring team using randomly selected plots 
(Griscom et al., 2005), assessed on a yearly basis during 
the five-year period. Follow-up questions were asked 
after each scheme was presented, which included where 
they would plant the seedlings and how much area. They 
were also asked whether the schemes would change 
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their intended planting plans (e.g. to plant crop trees) 
for that plot. We did not specify what land-use/land-
cover type would be replaced under each scheme, thus 
study participants were free to decide where to plant 
trees and how much area this would entail. Follow-
up questions determined the extent of agricultural 
displacement expected (e.g. croplands vs abandoned/
marginal lands). In addition, they were asked open-
ended qualitative questions (coded with responses 
seen only by the interviewer) regarding perceived 
benefits of the proposed schemes. Respondents who 
did not wish to participate in any of the schemes were 
prompted to discuss why they would opt out. These 
questions were designed to assess the kinds of risks 
and uncertainties associated with PES schemes of 
this nature with respect to landowners’ perceived 
benefits in being paid to reforest with diverse native 
species. The survey concluded by asking what sort of 
constraints or future land-use changes the participants 
envisaged, followed by some basic socioeconomic 
questions.
Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS 
version 20 (Pallant, 2010) to determine (i) whether 
there was a significant difference in uptake and area 
enrolled for reforestation under each consecutive 
scheme, and (ii) whether land-owner type, age or 
landholding size influenced participation and land 
enrolment into corresponding schemes. Qualitative 
data was transcribed and translated into English by 
the field assistant. Audio recordings and transcripts 
were analysed by the first author to identify important 
themes. 
Results
Basic attributes of the sample
All participants in the sample (n=34) were males 
between the ages of 30 and 81 with a median age of 57. 
Median household size was five. Over three quarters 
of the respondents were permanent residents of their 
villages while the remainder (n=8) spent only summers 
there. This is likely to be an artefact of sampling but 
we believe our sample is broadly representative of the 
relevant population, i.e. landowners with some active 
level of interest in managing the land. Ninety-one per 
cent indicated that their landholdings were located 
Figure 1. Partial map of Lebanon showing the eight important plant 
areas (IPAs) in the study area, indicated as shaded polygons (Yazbek et 
al., 2010). Landowners from 17 villages located within these IPAs were 
sampled for this study. Source for base mapping: Google Earth.
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within villages where they resided. Respondents were 
generally well educated (Fig. 2a) and included full-
time commercial farmers, part-time farmers and hobby 
or retired farmers (Fig. 2b). Aggregated landholding 
area of the sample was approximately 227 ha. Parcels 
ranged from 0.15 to 30 ha (median=3 ha). Nine 
landowners owned property over 10 ha, consisting 
of mainly hobby/retired farmers. Landholding size 
differed weakly between levels of education (Kruskal-
Wallis H-test=7.810, p=0.099). Part-time and hobby 
farmers did not have smaller landholdings than full-
time farmers (Kruskal-Wallis H-test=0.258, p=0.879; 
Fig. 2b).
Past and intended future planting (in the absence 
of PES)
The sample was highly skewed in terms of 
landholding size, recent planting area, and number 
of crop trees planted per respondent. Apples (Malus 
domestica Borkh) were the main commercial crop trees 
planted, followed by stone fruits (e.g. Prunus spp.). A 
large portion of the commercial tree crops were planted 
on previously abandoned croplands (Fig. 3). Four 
respondents indicated that they had planted productive 
native trees, e.g. stone pine (Pinus pinea L.), but none 
had planted other native trees. Nearly 75% had planted 
over 100 commercial saplings within the last 10 years. 
Eighteen respondents intended to plant more trees in 
the near future. Fifteen hectares was the approximate 
total area expected to be planted with over 75% taking 
place on previously abandoned lands. Apples, stone 
fruit, and nut-bearing trees were the main commercial 
trees to be planted, with mean anticipated areas of 7.1, 
5.5 and 2.1 ha, respectively. None mentioned intentions 
of planting native forest trees in the future other than 
stone pine.
Participation and land enrolment in the PES 
schemes
Twenty-two landowners would be willing to 
participate in the results-based loan (Scheme 
1), offering 21.9 ha of land for reforestation 
(approximately 10% of total landholding area). 
Participation increased to 27 farmers with 35.5 ha 
land enrolled (c16%) for the action-based grant 
(Scheme 2), but the results-based payments (Scheme 
3) did not change the number participating, and only 
slightly increased the land area to 37.5 ha (17%). 
A Friedman test indicated a statistically significant 
difference in land enrolment between schemes 
(Friedman’s ANOVA χ2 (2)=25.10, p<0.001). Post 
hoc Wilcoxon tests found a significant increase in 
land enrolment from Scheme 1 to Scheme 2 (T=169, 
r=−0.62, p<0.001) and Scheme 1 to Scheme 3 
(T=198, r=−0.60, p<0.001), but not from Scheme 
2 to Scheme 3 (T=77.5, r=−0.27, p=0.116). We 
tested whether total landholding size (in ha), age, 
and landowner type (divided between ‘full-time 
farmer’ and ‘other’) influenced participation in 
each of the three schemes using logistic regression 
following preliminary analyses to ensure underlying 
assumptions of models were not violated (Pallant, 
2010). Younger landowners and those with larger 
holdings were more likely to participate in Scheme 
1, but these effects disappeared for Schemes 2 and 
3 as a greater number of older landowners and 
Figure 2. Landowner type subdivided by education (a). Total landholdings by landowner type (b). Landowner type 
was divided between full-time farmer (most income derived from farming), part-time farmer and hobby / retired 
farmer.
(a)                                                                                             (b)
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landowners with smaller holdings were attracted to 
the schemes (Table 1).
Agricultural displacement under PES schemes
Seventeen per cent of reforestation would be on 
cultivated lands (or land in use) under the results-
based loan (Scheme 1), 11.5% under the action-
based grant (Scheme 2), and 12.4% under the 
results-based payments (Scheme 3). However, 
over 65% of respondents that indicated cultivated 
lands under any of the schemes mentioned they 
would plant at the margins (e.g. borders) of existing 
cultivation. Eight respondents stated their intended 
planting plans would change under schemes (i.e. 
native trees would be planted in place of crop trees) 
of which four mentioned plantings would take place 
on cultivated lands.
Respondents who declared they would participate 
in at least one of the three schemes (n=29) were 
asked if they would foresee any possible land-use 
changes that may impact the trees in the future. 
Twelve mentioned no foreseeable changes, ten 
indicated they may build on those plots, four 
mentioned passing lands onto children, and three 
indicated possible agricultural land-use changes. 
Ten respondents mentioned on-farm benefits of 
forest trees as possible reasons for maintaining trees 
beyond the life of the scheme. These included erosion 
prevention, regulating local climates, filtering the air, 
and as windbreaks. Four respondents also mentioned 
increasing landscape beauty as a benefit, related to 
potential future investments in ecotourism activities. 
Finally, over half of the participating respondents 
indicated they would be interested in longer term 
payments.
Landowner perceptions of PES schemes
The hypothetical schemes were used to initiate 
a discussion of landowners’ perceptions of PES 
schemes in general, and specific characteristics 
of the three schemes. Respondents’ views of PES 
varied with a greater portion seeing advantages of 
providing financial and technical support for farmers. 
One respondent claimed he would buy more land 
to enrol if these types of support were genuine and 
trustworthy. Unsurprisingly, respondents showed 
a greater keenness towards the action-based grant 
(Scheme 2) over the results-based loan (Scheme 
1) due to relaxed conditions of the latter (i.e. lower 
risk), but the results-based payments (Scheme 3) 
was no more popular. Some respondents discussed 
higher payoffs as the main advantage that Scheme 
3 had over Scheme 2. One respondent mentioned 
continuity of payments as a major advantage, and 
increased the enrolled land by 1 ha from Scheme 2 
to Scheme 3:
“The 3rd [scheme] ensures a certain continuity 
to the [reforestation] plan by [incentivising] the 
Table 1. Logistic regression for predicting likelihood of enrolling in PES schemes[a]
B SE Wald d.f. Sig. OR
95% CI for OR
Lower Upper
Scheme 1 (Constant) 3.969 2.235 3.152  0.076 52.911
Landowner type 1.182 1.079 1.200 1 0.273 3.260 0.393 27.015
Age -0.090 0.043 4.342 1 *0.037 0.914 0.839 0.995
Landholding size 0.368 0.183 4.044 1 *0.044   1.4450 1.009 2.068
Scheme 2 (Constant) 0.689 1.994 0.119  0.730 1.991   
Landowner type -1.808 1.271 2.024 1 0.155 0.164 0.014 1.979
Age -0.009 0.036 0.065 1 0.799 0.991 0.923 1.063
Landholding size 0.863 0.557 2.399 1 0.121 2.370 0.795 7.064
Scheme 3 (Constant) 2.574 2.092 1.514  0.219 13.112   
Landowner type -0.072 0.997 0.005 1 0.943 0.931 0.132 6.568
Age -0.039 0.036 1.159 1 0.282 0.962 0.896 1.032
Landholding size 0.319 0.236 1.821 1 0.177 1.375 0.886 2.185
[a]Collinearity diagnostics showed that there was no violation of multicollinearity assumptions with the variables tested (VIF=1.015). 
Normal probability plots of the regression standardised residuals showed there were no outliers (critical value=13.82; Mahal max-
imum distance=8.84). *p<0.05
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farmer to [put] more effort in [ensuring] high rates 
of [survival] so he can get the highest amount of 
money” (Resp. #6)
Yet, fifteen respondents enrolled the same amount 
of land for all three schemes. Availability of land 
unsuitable for agriculture was the main constraint to 
participation and land enrolment mentioned. While 
there was a marginal increase of land enrolled for those 
who would participate in all three schemes (n=6), one 
respondent would enrol less land for Scheme 3 than 
Scheme 2. His reasoning was that since there is no need 
for maintenance under the action-based grant (Scheme 
2), he would plant a much larger yet more remote plot 
with limited access, whereas he would plant borders of 
his orchard under the results-based payment (Scheme 
3) for ease of care. However, many non-participants 
simply did not see any benefit of planting native trees 
regardless of the contract type or money offered. 
Most of the respondents who opted out of all schemes 
shared a dislike of non-productive native trees and/
or diversified land-uses. For instance, one respondent 
mentioned he would not even consider diversifying 
his production, preferring to plant one profitable crop 
(“nothing beats apples in this region”). If given the 
option to plant native trees, the most likely candidate 
would be stone pine for its revenues from pine nuts, but 
most might still prefer to plant apples:
“Landowners won’t grow forest trees on their 
agricultural lands for the following reasons: Fruit trees 
are more profitable [in the short-run] because they 
require less time to produce as opposed to [productive] 
forest trees; fruit trees can be secured as a source of 
revenue while the majority of forest [species] don't 
generate revenues” (Resp. #34)
In general, respondents’ comments on PES 
schemes would suggest that opportunity costs 
were too high. Yet institutional factors may also 
influence uptake. For example, at least three of 
our respondents referred to the legal implications 
of planting forest trees. Since permits are required 
for cutting or removal of native conifers even on 
private lands (Regato & Asmar, 2011), landowners 
(especially farmers) may be reluctant to plant non-
productive species on productive farmlands. And 
while Lebanon’s current forestry policies may have 
contributed to relative gains in forest cover on 
abandoned farmlands, they may also have hindered 
effective forest management and made landowners 
reluctant to plant more forest trees:
“In the past, forests were well managed and 
protected by the local people because they were 
a source of [fodder], wood, and medicinal and 
aromatic plants... Today, more restrictions have been 
implemented by the MOA to protect forest areas, but 
this has actually discouraged people to preserve 
their forested lands because [these new laws have 
made forests] ‘useless’. Now violations, neglect and 
forest fires have increased... [because only] when 
people find a benefit from something, they will work 
to protect [it].” (Resp. #1)
Lack of experience with incentive-based 
mechanisms, or attitudes towards government-
sponsored agricultural programmes such as 
the MOA’s ‘Green Plan’ (subsidies aimed at 
rehabilitating abandoned farmlands), may have also 
contributed to negative perception of PES schemes 
in general:
“…the lack of trust in the governmental institutions 
and the incapacity of the farmer to invest in such 
[agricultural] projects is the main reason most farmers 
won't apply [for] the Green Plan.” (Resp. #21)
There were other factors respondents mentioned that 
contributed to lack of uptake and/or land-enrolment 
besides land availability and the land-use types in 
question (e.g. lack of land unsuitable for agriculture). 
In addition to negative attitudes towards native 
species, changing trends in land market prices were 
also important factors respondents raised that impact 
participation. Fewer younger landowners are actively 
managing their holdings than before, hence age will 
likely be a factor affecting uptake as well. Respondents 
in our sample were quite aged (median 57), which is 
Figure 3. Mean area planted with commercial crops 
under different land-use/land-cover types subdivided 
by farmers’ motives for planting the crops mentioned. 
‘Low cost / effort’ refers to easy management of the 
trees, ‘Market only’ refers to high market value of the 
crop, and ‘Profit maxim’ denotes respondents who 
mentioned both low cost and high market value. Note: 
An outlier was excluded to better present the results in 
this figure.
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reflective of a declining agricultural sector driving many 
households into cities in search of work. For instance, 
one respondent chose not to subscribe to any of the 
schemes both due to his age and the fact that his children 
no longer live in the village. He gave interesting insights 
that point to potential constraints in implementing a PES 
programme with landowners in Lebanon:
“Nowadays, the younger generation is not interested 
in agriculture and the older generation is no longer 
able to maintain the land... so [younger landowners] 
are selling their lands instead of [maintaining] and 
cultivating them…” (Resp. #17)
This suggests that reforesting private lands may be 
hindered by a lack of human resources to manage land 
on some farms and by development on others.
Discussion
Asset-building PES such as reforestation requires 
long-term maintenance to ensure future additionality 
of off-farm ES. Though results-based schemes may 
be more effective in ensuring long-term tree retention 
than action-based schemes, they depend heavily on 
landowners’ perceptions of the credibility of such long-
term payments. Frontloading payments to cover direct 
costs of planting and maintenance is common in PES 
using productive trees with private benefits (Hegde et 
al., 2014), but this is much more challenging under 
biodiversity-focused PES as in this study. Cost-effective 
PES aimed at enhancing biodiversity therefore involve 
trade-offs for both buyers and potential suppliers with 
respect to risks (Banerjee et al., 2017). For example, 
buyers would have to weigh trade-offs between 
efficiency (e.g. low payments, transaction costs, and 
displacement) and effectiveness (e.g. supplier uptake, 
extent of land enrolled, tree retention) when designing 
contracts while sellers weigh the risks and reward of 
those contracts (Table 2).
While it plays a key role in asset-building schemes, 
conditionality tends to limit participation if landowners 
perceive it as too risky (Chen et al., 2009). The PES 
schemes in our experiment were designed specifically 
to investigate how landowners perceive risks related 
to conditionality. The first two schemes (results-based 
loan and action-based grant) differed substantially in 
their level of risk to landowners, and a reduction in risk 
predictably increased enrolment. However, surprisingly 
the addition of results-based payments (Scheme 3) 
did not significantly increase uptake, despite higher 
payoffs in the long run. This may be due to landowner 
perceptions of risk and uncertainty in general, 
particularly for those with incomes tied to farming and 
forestry (Blennow et al., 2014; Menapace et al., 2013), 
as well as risks specifically attributed to results-oriented 
schemes (Burton & Schwarz, 2013). For example, 
monitoring could be viewed as both an annoyance and 
loss of autonomy (Hudson & Lusk, 2004). Lack of 
trust was a key issue raised in the study by a handful 
of study participants and qualitative probing revealed 
some interesting responses by landowners with regards 
to trust in the schemes, as well as with PES in general. 
PES was as a novel concept to most of the study 
participants with only few ever having participated in 
reforestation. It would be expected that participants 
would feel some degree of uncertainty and distrust in 
PES until they could see how well it works in reality 
(e.g. experiences shared by neighbouring farmers 
participating in a PES programme). While compliance 
to monitoring appeared to have discouraged some 
respondents, this was not shared by most. There is also 
the possibility that Scheme 3 was not considered to be 
credible over the long timescale required to ensure tree 
retention by landowners; especially in a country which 
has experienced considerable socio-political turmoil. 
In Lebanon, national agricultural policies have 
overshadowed multifunctional land-use strategies 
traditionally employed by local communities for 
managing natural resources (Makhzoumi et al., 2012). 
This has led not only to poor management of forests 
(e.g. thickets prone to fires), but has also discouraged 
landowners from planting forest trees. Within this 
institutional context, landowners may be especially 
reluctant to plant trees that offer little private benefit 
in the long-run (as is the case with most native tree 
species). With respect to asset-building PES such as 
reforestation, additionality of most ecosystem services 
occurs over much longer time scales than with use-
restricting PES. Perceptions of PES schemes and their 
subsequent adoption require evaluating long-term 
uncertainties (e.g. tenure, opportunity costs, market or 
political stability, climate, etc.), often affected by present 
day conditions of institutions and policies (Zanella et 
al., 2014). The Lebanese may inherently exhibit more 
caution and scepticism in making decisions that require 
long-time commitments due to historically persistent 
political instability (Makdisi, 2004).  Likewise, some 
participants mentioned having a general distrust 
in public institutions (e.g. MOA) due to previous 
experiences in subsidized programs like the 'Green 
Plan'. This raises questions on whether perceptions of 
PES would change based on who the buyers are, e.g. 
government vs NGOs vs private sector. Recovery from 
a 15-year civil war is being hampered by socio-political 
divisions that continue to paralyze the nation's public 
institutions. The public sector’s inability to regain 
control of its institutions, due also in part to its lack 
of transparency, leads to widespread corruption (often 
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referred to as 'wasta', which appears to have become 
a social norm). A growing number of NGOs have 
begun to fill this void and have gained more trust than 
government institutions (Solberg, 2014) Such factors 
may have negative implications for PES in Lebanon as 
government institutions desperately try to re-establish 
oversight of the forestry sector through consolidating 
re/afforestation efforts and enforcing policies.
Many studies have found that participation in asset-
building PES is contingent upon farm-based incomes 
(i.e. opportunity costs), farming systems (e.g. available 
marginal lands), landholding size, and age (e.g. Cole, 
2010; Kisaka & Obi, 2015). Recent studies on incentives 
for re/afforestation have also shown that decisions to 
participate in such schemes may not be solely based 
on actual or perceived opportunity costs, but also on 
non-financial factors related to risks and uncertainties 
(Duesberg et al., 2013). Our results suggest that 
consideration of opportunity costs was ubiquitous 
amongst respondents, especially if they could foresee 
possibilities of bringing land in disuse back into 
cultivation, or the prospect of developing their land in 
the future. Moreover, landowners’ opportunity costs 
could vary from one plot to the next, and perhaps even 
within the same plot (Wunder, 2007). Respondents 
in our sample owned modest size holdings, and 
may have been conservative with how much land 
they would be willing to enrol. Landowners would 
have to consider important trade-offs when selecting 
plots with the lowest opportunity costs, such as 
direct costs of planting and irrigating seedlings on 
difficult terrain. This is particularly critical for less 
experienced tree planters who may underestimate 
the level of difficulty or work involved, which is 
especially relevant for those that are quite aged. 
Reasons why landowners in our study (particularly 
full-time farmers) would opt out of schemes accord 
with other studies, particularly if livelihoods would 
be affected by having native species on farms, 
such as loss of tenure and negative perceptions of 
biodiversity (Zubair & Garforth, 2006). More recent 
studies have also indicated that uptake of asset-
building PES initiatives depends more on landowner 
attitudes and perceptions of how such policies affect 
future livelihoods (Trevisan et al., 2016).
The overall success of an asset-building PES 
programme in Lebanon requires not only long-
term tree retention, but would have to factor in the 
programme’s potential for displacing agriculture. 
This is important to consider in the context of an 
agricultural sector that is changing rapidly with 
emigration of rural households, combined with 
urbanisation and increasing land prices in some 
areas. Our results suggest that these schemes would 
not result in significant displacement, as they are 
not competitive with agriculture, but may therefore 
result in small and fragmented reforestation. Of 
the estimated 9,800 ha of abandoned farmlands in 
the six districts where our study was conducted, 
more than half was suitable for agriculture (Salibi, 
2007). Many are abandoned due to lack of access 
to water and roads, in which case road-building and 
agricultural development projects could potentially 
increase opportunity costs. If an asset-building PES 
programme were implemented these infrastructural 
improvements could be stimulated by the programme 
itself. 
Finally, we acknowledge that a more representative 
sample size would have helped tremendously in 
quantitative analysis of each scheme and would have 
helped draw a more cohesive picture of landowner 
perceptions to conditionality. However, this study 
was concerned with developing a more qualitative 
assessment of PES and the schemes presented, as has 
been conducted in other case-studies (e.g. Zanella et 
al., 2014). We also acknowledge the limitations of 
mixed-methods studies in that it would have been 
difficult to combine qualitative analysis with a much 
larger sample size. A more representative sample 
would also have to include absentee landowners, 
whose incomes are presumably not tied to farming. 
Therefore, our study focussed on full-time residents, 
most with vested interests in farming. Despite this, 
there was considerable heterogeneity amongst 
farmers and their preferences, yet social and 
institutional aspects appeared to play an important 
role in uptake for most. These included issues 
with credibility and trust in new institutions as 
well as legal implications of planting native trees 
on private lands, resulting in high opportunity 
costs and unforeseeable risks in the future. Future 
research may want to examine whether absentee 
landowners, presumably having larger holdings with 
little or no commercial farming, are less risk averse 
Table 2. Trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness of 
schemes
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3
Farmer uptake Medium High High
Area enrolled Low Medium Medium
Displacement Medium Low Low
Risks (to farmers) High Low Low/Medium
Transaction costs [a] High Low High
Payment costs [a] Low Med High
[a] These are reasonable estimates of the costs to buyers involved 
in mounting the schemes
Asset-building payments for ecosystem services in Lebanon
Forest Systems August 2017 • Volume 26 • Issue 2 • e012
11
than those in our sample, and thus may display a 
greater willingness-to-accept PES and enrolling 
more land. If PES buyers would prefer targeting 
absentee landowners with lower opportunity costs 
over farmers, they must be reminded that long-term 
ecological outcomes are closely tied to efficiency 
and equity trade-offs.
Conclusion
This paper examined the potential for PES to 
incentivize landowners to plant diverse native trees 
on private property. The objective of this mixed-
methods study was to examine how Lebanese 
landowners perceive PES schemes and how different 
forms of conditionality might affect participation. 
Combined qualitative and quantitative methods 
enabled us to gauge landowners’ perceptions towards 
schemes, helping to identify factors that would 
influence uptake, land enrolment and establishment 
of native trees on private property in the long run. 
Lebanese landowners from montane villages are 
heterogeneous in their occupations, landholdings, 
and preferences. Despite this, many appeared 
willing to participate in asset-building PES aimed 
at enhancing biodiversity. Qualitative probing 
revealed some of the constraints and challenges 
perceived by landowners, which helped strengthen 
our quantitative results. We found that the addition of 
results-based payments (Scheme 3) did not increase 
participation or land enrolment, possibly due to a 
lack of trust in long-term programmes, especially in 
a society facing constant turmoil. We also identified 
the importance of uncertain future opportunity 
costs in a rapidly changing rural context. This 
study demonstrates the importance of combining 
qualitative and quantitative data collection in studies 
of PES and shows that the potential for tailoring PES 
schemes to supply off-farm ecosystem services will 
depend on understanding landowners’ perceptions.
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